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Abstract
We compare two established jury selection procedures meant to safeguard against the
inclusion of biased jurors that are also perceived as causing minorities to be under-
represented in juries. The Strike and Replace procedure presents potential jurors one-
by-one to the parties, while the Struck procedure presents all potential jurors before
the parties exercise vetoes. In equilibrium, Struck more effectively excludes extreme
jurors than Strike and Replace but leads to a worse representation of minorities. Sim-
ulations suggest that the advantage of Struck in terms of excluding extremes is sizable
in a wide range of cases. In contrast, Strike and Replace only provides a significantly
better representation of minorities if the minority and majority are heavily polarized.
When parameters are estimated to match the parties’ selection of jurors by race with
jury-selection data from Mississippi in trials against black defendants, the procedures’
outcomes are substantially different, and the size of the trade-off between objectives
can be quantitatively evaluated.
JEL Classification: K40, K14, J14, J16
Keywords: Jury selection, Peremptory challenge, Minority representation, Gender rep-
resentation




In the U.S. legal system, it is customary to let the parties involved in a jury trial dismiss
some of the potential jurors without justification. These dismissals, known as peremptory
challenges, are meant to enable “each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most
partial toward the other side” thereby “eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both sides”.1
In the last decades, however, peremptory challenges have been criticized, mainly because
they are perceived as causing some groups — in particular minorities — to be under-
represented in juries.2
The procedure used to let the parties exercise their challenges varies greatly across
jurisdictions and is sometimes left to the discretion of the judge.3 Two classes of procedures
are most frequently used in the U.S. In the Struck procedure (henceforth: STR), the parties
can observe and extensively question all the jurors who could potentially serve on their
trial before exercising their challenges (this questioning process is known as voir dire). In
contrast, in the Strike and Replace procedure (henceforth: S&R), smaller groups of jurors
are sequentially presented to the parties. The parties observe and question the group they
are presented with (sometimes a single juror) but must exercise their challenges on that
group without knowing the identity of the next potential jurors.
The goal of this paper is to shed light on a debate that emerged in the legal doctrine
over the relative effectiveness of STR and S&R at satisfying the two objectives of excluding
extreme jurors and ensuring adequate group representation. Bermant and Shapard (1981,
pp. 93-94), for example, argues that, by avoiding uncertainty, STR “always gives advocates
more information on which to base their challenges, and, therefore, [...] is always to be
preferred”. Bermant further notes that “a primary purpose of peremptory challenges is to
1Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990).
2For examples of this line of argument against peremptory challenges, see Sacks (1989), Broderick (1992),
Hochman (1993), Marder (1994), and Smith (2014). Despite these attacks, the U.S. has so far resisted
abandoning peremptory challenges altogether (unlike other countries, like the U.K. where they were abolished
in 1988). Peremptory challenges remain pervasive in all U.S. jurisdictions and have been affirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court as “one of the most important rights secured to the accused;” (Swain v. Alabama 380
U.S. 202 (1965), see LaFave et al., 2009).
3For example, in criminal cases in Illinois, “[State Supreme Court] Rule 434(a) expressly grants a trial
court the discretion to alter the traditional procedure for impaneling juries so long as the parties have
adequate notice of the system to be used and the method does not unduly restrict the use of peremptory
challenges” (People v. McCormick, 328 Ill.App.3d 378, 766 N.E.2d 671, (2d Dist., 2002)).
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eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides” and that “the superiority of the struck jury
method in accomplishing this purpose is manifest.”
Others have argued that, by revealing the identity of all potential jurors before chal-
lenges are exercised, STR facilitates the exclusion of some groups from juries. Although in
Batson v. Kentucky and J. E. B. v. Alabama the Supreme Court found it unconstitutional
to challenge potential jurors based on their race or gender,4 proving that a challenge is
based on race or gender is often difficult and the Supreme Court’s mandate is notoriously
hard to implement.5 Interestingly, in response, judges themselves have turned to the de-
sign of the challenge procedure and the use of S&R as an instrument to foster adequate
group representation. For example, in a memorandum on judges’ practices regarding jury
selection, Shapard and Johnson (1994) reports about judges believing that by “prevent[ing]
counsel from knowing who might replace a challenged juror” S&R procedures “make it more
difficult to pursue a strategy prohibited by Batson”.
To inform this debate, we extend in Section 2 the model of jury selection proposed in
Brams and Davis (1978) by allowing potential jurors to belong to two different groups. In
the model, each potential juror is characterized by a probability to vote in favor of the
defendant’s conviction. This probability is drawn from a distribution that depends on the
juror’s group-membership. The group distributions are common knowledge but the parties
to the trial, a plaintiff and a defendant, only observe their realization for a particular
juror upon questioning that juror. The parties have opposing goals: the plaintiff wants
to maximize the probability of conviction, whereas the defendant seeks to maximize the
probability of acquittal.
A jury must be formed to decide the outcome of the trial and the parties can influence its
composition by challenging (i.e., vetoing) a certain number of potential jurors. Challenges
are exercised according to S&R or STR procedures which, as explained above, differ mainly
in the timing of jurors’ questioning (and, as a consequence, in the parties’ ability to observe
4476 U.S. 79 (1986) and, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). In terms of legal procedures, the response to these decision
has consisted in allowing the parties to appeal peremptories from their opponent, allowing them to nullify a
peremptory if they can show that it was indeed based on race. These appeals are known as Batson appeals.
5See Raphael and Ungvarsky (1993): “In virtually any situation, an intelligent plaintiff can produce a
plausible neutral explanation for striking Pat despite the plaintiff’s having acted on racial bias. Consequently,
given the current case law, a plaintiff who wishes to offer a pretext for a race-based strike is unlikely to
encounter difficulty in crafting a neutral explanation.” See also Marder (2012) or Daly (2016) for why
judges rarely rule in favor of Batson appeals.
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the conviction probability of potential jurors).
We ask how these two procedures perform in achieving the objectives of excluding ex-
treme jurors and ensuring adequate group representation. In Section 3, we provide some
intuition for our main result by introducing an illustrative example where a single juror
must be selected and the defendant and plaintiff have a single challenge available. In this
example, we show that STR is more effective than S&R at excluding jurors from the tails
of the conviction probability distribution, but is less likely to select minority jurors.
The rest of the paper is devoted to characterizing conditions under which these results
extend beyond the illustrative example of Section 3. In Section 4 we call a juror extreme if
its conviction probability falls below (above) a given threshold. We prove that there always
exists a low enough threshold such that STR is more likely than S&R to exclude extreme
jurors. Moreover, we show that STR always selects fewer extreme jurors than a random
selection would, but that there are some (admittedly somewhat unusual) circumstances
in which S&R would not. Simulations assuming a wide range of conviction probability
distributions reveal that, in terms of excluding extreme jurors, the advantage of STR over
S&R can be substantial, even for relatively high thresholds.
Section 5 compares procedures according to their ability to select minorities and identi-
fies conditions under which S&R selects more minority jurors than STR. Our proof uses a
limiting argument showing that the result holds when the minority is vanishingly small and
the distributions of conviction probabilities for each group minimally overlap (i.e., groups
are polarized). However, simulations again suggest that the result remains true when the
size of the minority is relatively high and the overlap between distributions is significant. In
Section 6, we explore how changing the number of challenges affect the results of Sections
4 and 5.
Depending on the extent to which jurors of different races have polarized preferences
for conviction, the model has different empirical implications for the selection of jurors by
race. In Section 7 we exploit peremptory challenge data on a version of STR adopted in
Fifth Circuit Court District of Mississippi to estimate the groups’ distributions of conviction
probabilities, and to simulate the outcomes of counterfactual procedures. Results show that
groups appear to be substantially polarized in their preferences for convictions, and that
the choice of procedure affects both exclusion of extreme jurors and minority representation
substantially.
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In Section 8 we show how our main theoretical results results extend to a different
definition of extreme juries (i.e., a jury in which the highest (lowest) conviction-probability
juror is below (above) a given threshold). We also explore how the procedures compare in
selecting members of groups that are about equal size (such as male and females, as opposed
to minorities which induce groups of unequal sizes).
Related Literature
This paper belongs to a relatively small literature formalizing jury selection procedures.
Brams and Davis (1978) model S&R as a game and derive its subgame-perfect equilibrium
strategies which we use in our theoretical results and simulations. Perhaps closest to our
paper is Flanagan (2015) who shows that, compared to randomly selecting jurors, STR
increases the probability that all jurors come from one particular side of the median of the
conviction probability distribution (because STR induces correlation between the convic-
tion probability of the selected jurors). To our knowledge, this literature is silent on the
implications of jury selection for group representation and on the trade-off between exclud-
ing extreme jurors and ensuring adequate group representation induced by using different
procedures. These are the focus and main contributions of this paper.
While the group-composition of a jury has been shown to influence the outcome of a
trial (Anwar et al., 2012; Flanagan, 2018), legal scholars often argue in favor of represen-
tative juries regardless of their effect on verdicts. Diamond et al. (2009) for example argue
that “unrepresentative juries [...] threaten the public’s faith in the legitimacy of the legal
system”. In an experiment on jury-eligible individuals, they show that participants rate the
outcome of trials as significantly fairer when the jury is racially heterogeneous than when
it is not. This motivates us to consider group-representativity itself as a desirable feature
of jury selection procedures.6
6One might also be interested in the impact of group-representation on the conviction of defendants
who themselves belong to different groups. Without taking groups into account or attempting to compare
procedures, Flanagan (2015) studies the impact of jury selection procedures on conviction rates. His results
in terms of conviction rates require to assume that the parties have correct beliefs about the probability that
jurors eventually vote for conviction (as well as about these probabilities are independent of one another). In
contrast, our results about group-representation and exclusion of extremes do not require that the parties’
belief at the moment of jury selection be accurate (at least if we are concerned with extremes as perceived
by the parties, as the U.S. Supreme Court seems to be when saying that the main purpose of peremptory
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The empirical literature on jury selection has also identified systematic patterns of group-
specific challenges from the parties, with the plaintiffs being almost always more likely to
remove minority jurors than defendants (Turner et al., 1986; Rose, 1999; Diamond et al.,
2009; Anwar et al., 2012; Craft, 2018; Flanagan, 2018). This justifies our assumption that,
at least from the perspective of parties’ beliefs, jurors from different groups tend to have
different probabilities of voting for conviction.
Diamond et al. (2009) show that for a fixed number of challenges endowed to the parties,
larger juries tend to be more representative of the pool’s demographic.7 In Section 6, we
show that limiting the number of challenges (while keeping the number of selected jurors
fixed) can have a similar effect, though at the expense of a less effective exclusion of extreme
jurors.
2 Model
There are two parties to a trial, the defendant, D, and the plaintiff, P . The outcome of the
trial is decided by a jury of j jurors who must be selected from the population. The parties
share a common belief about the probability that a juror i will vote to convict the defendant.
We denote this probability ci ∈ [0, 1]. Jurors draw this probability independently from the
same random variable C, with probability distribution f(c). We denote its cumulative with
F (c) and its expected value with µ. Throughout, we assume that C is continuous. To
simplify the notation, we also assume that the boundaries of the support of C are 0 and 1.8
To address the issue of group representation, we assume that jurors belong to one of two
groups a or b. The parties have common beliefs about the probability that jurors from each
group vote to convict the defendant. We index the distributions representing these beliefs
and their averages with subscript g ∈ {a, b}: fg(c), Fg(c), and µg.
9 The corresponding
challenges is to enable “each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial toward the other
side”, see Footnote 1 and associated quote).
7Diamond et al. (2009) take advantage of a feature of civil cases in Florida where juries are made of six
jurors unless one of the parties requests a jury of twelve jurors and pays for the costs associated with such
a larger jury.
8This assumption is without loss of generality and all our results hold if C is re-scaled in such a way that
F (c) = 0 or [1− F (1− c)] = 0 for some c ∈ (0, 1).
9 Empirical evidence, including the one we report in Section 7 shows that that parties use their challenges
unevenly across groups; see also the Related Literature section of the Introduction.
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random variables are denoted by Ca and Cb. Although throughout conviction probabilities
and their distributions across groups should only be viewed as representing the parties
common-beliefs, we henceforth lighten the terminology and speak directly of conviction
probabilities (rather than parties’ beliefs about conviction probabilities).
We let r denote the proportion of group-a jurors in the population, and when discussing
group representation, we assume that C is obtained by drawing from Ca with probability r
and from Cb with probability (1− r) (in particular, f(c) = rfa(c) + (1− r)fb(c)).
Following the majority of the literature (Brams and Davis, 1978; Flanagan, 2015), we
assume that, at the level of jury selection, the parties do not account for the process of
jury deliberations and — perhaps as a way to cope with the complexity of jury selection
— view the probabilities that jurors votes for conviction as independent from one another.
Since conviction in most U.S. trials requires a unanimous jury, the parties then consider
that a jury composed of jurors with conviction probabilities {ci}
j
i=1 convict the defendant
with probability Πji=1ci. The defendant, therefore, aims at minimizing Π
j
i=1ci while the
plaintiff wants to maximize the same product.
To influence the composition of jury, the defendant and the plaintiff are allowed to
challenge (veto) up to d and p of the jurors in a panel of n = j + d + p potential jurors
randomly and independently drawn the population (sometimes also called the pool).10 To
avoid trivial cases, we assume throughout that d, p ≥ 1. The parties use these challenges in
the course of a veto procedure M (formally, an extensive game-form). The jury resulting
from the procedure is called the effective jury.
The two veto procedures we study are the STRuck procedure (STR) and the Strike
And Replace procedure (S&R). For comparison, we also consider the Random procedure
(RAN ) which simply draws j jurors independently at random from the population. In all
procedures, we assume that once a potential juror i is presented to the parties, the parties
observe realized value of ci for that juror.
11 The two procedures however differ in the timing
10 In the legal literature, what we call “panel” is sometimes called “venire” (though terminology varies
and the latter term is sometimes used to speak of what we call the population).
11This is motivated by the practice of letting parties extensively question every juror they are presented
with, a process known in the legal terminology as voire dire. In turn, the fact that the parties have the same
assessment of the probability a juror will vote for conviction is motivated by the fact that voir dire occurs in
the presence of both parties, and that the parties therefore and have access to the same information about
the jurors’ demographics, background, and opinions.
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with which jurors are presented to the parties.
Under STR, the entire panel of j + d + p potential jurors is presented to the parties
before they have the opportunity to use any of their challenges. Each party, therefore,
observes the value of ci for every juror in the panel. The defendant and the plaintiff then
choose to challenge up to d and p of the jurors in the panel, respectively. In practice,
there are several types of STR procedures that differ in the way the parties exercise their
challenges after having questioned the jurors in the panel. For concreteness and tractability,
we focus in this paper on the STR procedure in which the parties have a single opportunity
to exercise their challenges on the whole panel. In equilibrium, this leads the plaintiff to
challenge the p jurors in the panel with lowest conviction probabilities, and the defendant
to challenge the d jurors with highest conviction probabilities.12 Whether these challenges
happen simultaneously or sequentially has no impact on the equilibrium and our results for
STR apply in either case.13
In contrast, under S&R, groups of potential jurors are randomly drawn from the popula-
tion and sequentially presented to the parties. In contrast with STR procedures, the parties
must exercise their challenges on jurors from a given group without knowing the identity of
jurors from subsequent groups. There is variation among S&R used in practice in the size of
the groups that are presented in each round.14 Again, for concreteness and tractability, we
focus in this paper on the S&R procedure in which jurors are presented to the parties one
at a time. The defendant and the plaintiff start the procedure with d and p challenges left,
respectively. After each draw, the plaintiff and the defendant observe the potential juror’s
conviction probability and, if they have at least one challenge left, choose whether or not
to challenge the juror. If a juror is not challenged by either party, it becomes a member of
12Alternative methods used in the field include procedures in which the parties to challenge sequentially
out of subgroups of jurors from the panel only. As long as the procedure remains of the struck type (i.e.,
the entire panel — and not only the first subgroup — is questioned before the parties start exercising their
challenges), the equilibrium effective jury is often the same as under the STR procedure we consider here.
Other outcome-irrelevant aspects of the equilibrium might, however, be different such as the number of
challenges used by the parties (e.g., if the first group is made of the j “middle” jurors in the panel, they
may in some cases be selected as effective jurors without the parties exercising any of their challenges).
13Since C is continuous, the probability that two jurors in a panel have the same conviction probability and
one of the parties does not use all of its challenges in equilibrium is zero and this eventuality can therefore
be neglected.
14As well as in the ability of the parties to challenge, in a later round, potential jurors who were left
unchallenged in previous rounds, a practice known as “backstricking”.
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the effective jury. Any challenged juror is dismissed and the number of challenges available
to the challenging party is decreased by one. The process continues until an effective jury
of j members is formed.
The (subgame perfect) equilibrium of S&R was characterized by Brams and Davis (1978)
and takes the form of threshold strategies. In every subgame, D challenges the presented
juror i if ci is above a certain threshold tD, P challenges i if ci is below some threshold tP , and
neither of the parties challenges i if ci ∈ [tP , tD].
15 We will sometimes refer to these values as
challenge thresholds. As Brams and Davis (1978) show, in any subgame, tP < tD and even
if the challenges happen simultaneously and both parties are charged for their challenges
when they both decide to challenge the presented juror, the latter (i.e., a challenge by both
parties) never occurs in equilibrium. The equilibrium is therefore unaffected by the timing
of challenges in each round and our results for S&R apply regardless of this timing.16
In our description of S&R, Nature moves in each round to draw a new potential juror
from the population to present to the parties. To facilitate conditional comparisons between
STR and S&R based on a particular fixed panel, it will sometimes be useful to consider an
equivalent description of S&R in which Nature first draws a panel of n jurors {c1, . . . , cn}
(which the parties are not aware of) and in each round k presents juror ck to the parties.
For similar purposes, it will sometimes be useful to view RAN as first drawing a panel of n
jurors and then (uniformly at random) selecting j jurors among these n to form the effective
jury.
3 Excluding extremes and representation of minorities: An
illustrative example
To illustrate the differences between the two procedures, consider the simple case d = p =
j = 1 together with distributions Ca ∼ U [0, 0.5] and Cb ∼ U [0.5, 1]. Also, suppose that
r = 0.1, i.e., there is a minority of 10% of group-a jurors in the population.
15Each subgame can be characterized by the number of jurors κ that remain to be selected, the number of
challenges left to the defendant δ, and the number of challenges left to the plaintiff π. The parties threshold
in subgame (κ, δ, π) are a function of the value of subgames (κ−1, δ, π), (κ, δ−1, π), and (κ, δ, π−1) (which
can result from the parties action in (κ, δ, π)) and the distribution of C, see Brams and Davis (1978).
16By “timing”, here, we mean the order (potentially simultaneous) in which the parties decide whether or
not to challenge the presented juror.
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Figure 1: Illustrative example, equilibrium outcomes under STR

























Note: The figure describes the equilibirum of STR assuming j = p = d = 1, Ca ∼ U [0, 0.5], Cb ∼ U [0.5, 1],
and r = 0.10. The initial node illustrates distribution C = 0.10 · Ca + 0.9 · Cb. The numbers on each arrow
indicate the probability of drawing a panel with the group-composition represented in the pointed boxes
(conditional on each panel composition, the circled letter in the box corresponds to the group-membership
of the selected juror). Dashed arrows correspond to outcomes that lead to the selection of a group-a juror
and the graph underneath each box shows the distribution of conviction probabilities for the selected juror.
Let Unx [a, b] denote the x-th order statistic for a U [a, b] random sample of size n. With
this notation, Figure 1 shows the group-membership and distribution of conviction probabil-
ity for the juror selected under STR, conditional on the composition of the panel. Observe
that in this example, if there are group-a jurors in the panel, one of them is systematically
challenged by the plaintiff. Therefore, for a group-a juror (i.e., a minority juror) to be
selected under STR, there need to be at least two group-a jurors in the panel of n = 3
presented to the parties. This occurs with probability 0.03.
In contrast, a group-a juror can be selected under S&R even if the panel contains a single
group-a juror. To understand why, consider the equilibrium of S&R which is illustrated
in Figure 2. If a group-b prospective juror with a sufficiently low conviction probability
(ci ∈ [0.5, 0.62]) is presented first, then it will be challenged by the plaintiff. This leads to a
subgame in which only the defendant has challenges left and a group-a juror is more likely
to be selected than if a juror was randomly drawn from the population. In particular, any
group-a juror presented at the beginning of this later subgame is left unchallenged by the
defendant and selected to be the effective juror (even if this juror is the only group-a juror
10
Figure 2: Illustrative example, equilibrium strategies and outcomes under S&R








ci ∈ [.78, 1]
D challenges
ci ∈ [.62, .78]
No challenges
Group-b
ci ∈ [0, .62]
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Round 2
ci ∈ [.70, 1]
D challenges
ci ∈ [0, .50]
No challenges
Group-a
ci ∈ [.5, .70]
No challenges
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ci ∈ [.70, 1]
No challenges
Group-b
ci ∈ [0, .70]
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ci ∈ [.5, 1]
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ci ∈ [0, .5]
Group-a
ci ∈ [.5, 1]
Group-b








Note: The figure describes the equilibrium strategies conditional on the conviction probability of the juror
drawn in each round for the case j = d = p = 1, Ca ∼ U [0, 0.5], Cb ∼ U [0.5, 1] and r = 0.10. Dashed arrows
correspond to paths that may lead to the selection of a group-a juror. The numbers on each arrow indicate
the probability of the path conditional on reaching the previous node. The second row of text inside boxes
indicates an equilibrium action, whereas bold text below boxes indicates the group of the selected juror in
the game outcome. In round 3, challenges from both parties are exhausted and the parties do not take any
action.
in the panel because the third juror — who, in this case, is never presented to the parties —
happens to be a group-b juror). This course of action follows from P ’s choice to challenge
a group-b juror with low conviction probability in the first round, which leaves P without
challenges left in the second round. This choice of P is optimal from the perspective of the
first round of S&R (before the plaintiff learns that the second juror in the panel is a group-a
juror), but suboptimal under STR where, having observed the conviction probability of all
jurors in the panel, the plaintiff would have challenged the group-a juror instead.
Considering only the branch of the S&R game-tree that starts with a challenge from P ,
the probability of selecting a group-a juror is almost 0.05 = 0.31·(0.54·0.1+0.10). Adding the
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possibility that a minority juror is selected after D challenges in the first round followed by a
challenge from P in the second round (which happens with probability 0.4 ·0.47 ·0.1 ≈ 0.02),
the probability of selecting a minority juror under S&R is 0.067.17 This is larger than the
probability under STR, 0.03, yet smaller than under RAN , 0.10.
In this example, the better representation of minority jurors produced by S&R comes
at the expense of selecting more extreme jurors. Suppose for the sake of illustration that
jurors are considered extreme if they come from the top or bottom 5th percentile of C.
In our example, the bottom and top 5th percentile corresponds to conviction probabilities
below 0.25 and above 0.94, respectively. The selected juror is within the bottom range with
probability 0.015 under STR versus 0.033 under S&R, and in the top range with probability
0.076 under STR versus 0.083 under S&R.
To understand the source of these differences, let us consider the bottom 5th percentile
[0, 0.25] (a symmetric explanation applies to the top 5th percentile). As indicated in Figure
1, when STR selects a group-a juror — the type of juror whose conviction probability
could possibly be in the bottom 5th percentile — the distribution of that juror’s conviction
probability follows the middle or upper order-statistics of a random sample from Ca. These
order-statistics are unlikely to result in the selection of a juror with conviction probability
in the bottom 5th percentile. In contrast, as Figure 2 illustrates, all paths leading S&R to
select a group-a juror result in the juror’s conviction probability being drawn from U [0, 0.5]
itself,which makes S&R more likely to select a juror in the bottom 5th percentile than STR.
In the next two sections, we investigate the extent to which the advantages of S&R in
terms of minority-representation and of STR in terms of exclusion of extreme generalizes
beyond this illustrative example.
4 Exclusion of extremes
In the United States, one of the objectives of the jury selection process is to guarantee an
impartial jury as dictated by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. In this respect,
the peremptory challenge procedures implemented in U.S. jurisdictions are often viewed
as a way to foster impartiality by preventing extreme potential jurors from serving on the
17These are the only cases in which a minority juror can be selected under S&R. In particular, jurors
accepted in the first round are always group-b jurors (ci ∈ [0.62, 0.78]). So are jurors accepted in the second
round following a challenge from D is the first round (ci ∈ [0.70, 1]).
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effective jury.18 In the context of our model, we interpret this goal as that of limiting the
presence in the jury of jurors from the tails of the distributions of conviction probabilities.
In Sections 4 to 6, we refer to a juror i as extreme if its conviction probability ci
lies below or above given thresholds (we refer the reader to Section 8 for results under
an alternative definition). For brevity, we will focus on jurors who qualify as extreme
because their conviction probability lies below some threshold c > 0. This is without loss
of generality and all our results about extreme jurors apply symmetrically to jurors whose
conviction probability lies above a given threshold c < 1.
In our illustrative example, jurors in the bottom 5th percentile of C are selected less
often under STR than S&R. This is not true in general. Fixing a particular threshold c > 0
— or percentile of C — to characterize jurors as extreme, there always exists distributions of
C and values of d, p, and j such that S&R selects fewer extreme jurors than STR. However,
our first result shows that regardless of the distribution and value of the parameters, there
always exists a threshold sufficiently small such that, if jurors are called “extreme” below
that threshold, the probability of selecting extreme jurors is greater under S&R than under
STR.
Let TM (x; c) denote the probability that there are at least x jurors with conviction
probability smaller or equal to c in the jury selected by procedure M .
Proposition 1. For any x ∈ {1, . . . , j}, there exists c > 0 such that TSTR(x; c) < TS&R(x; c)
for all c ∈ (0, c).
All proofs are in the appendix. A symmetric statement, which we omit, applies for
extreme jurors at the right-end of the distribution. Note that Proposition 1 can be rephrased
in terms of stochastic dominance. Let N cM denotes the expected number of jurors of type
ci ≤ c in the jury selected by procedure M . Then, Proposition 1 says that there exists c > 0
and such that N c
S&R
has first-order stochastic dominance over N cSTR for all c ∈ (0, c). A
direct corollary of Proposition 1 is therefore that the expected number of extreme jurors is
larger under S&R than under STR.
For some intuition about Proposition 1, consider the case x = 1. As illustrated in
Section 3, the panel must be composed of more than one extreme juror for STR to select
18See Footnote 1 and its associated quote. For legal arguments in favor of peremptory challenges based
on the Sixth Amendment, see, among others, Beck (1998), Biedenbender (1991), Bonebrake (1988), Horwitz
(1992), and Keene (2009).
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at least one such juror (since, if there is a single extreme juror in the panel, that juror is
systematically challenged by the plaintiff). In contrast, even in panels with a single extreme
juror, the extreme juror can be part of the effective jury resulting from S&R. This happens,
for example, if the extreme juror is presented to the parties after they both exhausted
all their challenges. The single extreme juror can also be accepted by both parties if its
conviction probability is sufficiently close to c and it is presented after the plaintiff used
most of its challenges on non-extreme potential jurors.19 The proof then follows from the
fact that, as c tends to zero, the probability that the panel contains more than one extreme
juror goes to zero faster than the probability the panel contains a single extreme juror.20
Proposition 1 is silent about the value of the threshold c below which STR selects fewer
jurors than S&R, as well as the size of TS&R(x; c)−TSTR(x; c) for c < c. These values depend
on the models’ parameters. To illustrate, we simulate TSTR(1; c) and TS&R(1; c) using j =
12, d = 6, and p = 6, a typical combination of jury size and number of peremptory challenges
in U.S. jurisdictions. For the distribution of conviction probabilities in the population, we
use symmetric mixtures of beta distributions that represents a population made of two
groups with polarized views, which allows easier comparison with the results from Section 5
in which we study group-representation. We provide simulation results for three mixtures of
the distributions illustrated in Figure 3, which are meant to represent extreme (Panel (a)),
moderate (Panel (b)), and mild levels of polarization (Panel (c)). Additional simulations
results using U [0, 1] instead are reported in Appendix B.
Using these parameters, STR is found to exclude more extreme jurors than S&R even
when the threshold for defining jurors as extreme is relatively high. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 4, the difference between the propensity of STR and S&R to select extreme jurors is
sizable. For example, in all three sets of simulations, only about 1% of juries selected by
19Subgames in which the defendant has more challenges left than the plaintiff can lead the plaintiff to be
conservative and accept jurors who are “barely extreme” (ci ≈ c) in order to save its few challenges left for
“very extreme” jurors (ci ≈ 0).
20Proposition 1 crucially depends on averaging across all possible panels and does not state that STR
rejects more extreme jurors than S&R for any particular realization of the panel. The latter would obviously
imply Proposition 1 but turns out to be false in general. For a counterexample, let j = d = p = 1. Consider
a panel of three jurors with c2 < c3 < c and c1 > c and the index of the jurors indicating the order in which
they are presented under S&R. For this panel, STR always leads to the selection of extreme juror 3. In
contrast, provided c2 falls between the challenge thresholds of the defendant and the plaintiff in the first
round (which happens with positive probability), S&R selects non-extreme juror 2.
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Figure 3: Distributions of conviction probabilities by group under extreme,
































STR feature at least one juror with conviction probability below the 10th percentile of the
distribution (the 10th percentile corresponds to 0.01 under the extreme polarization distri-
bution, 0.17 under moderate polarization, and 0.25 under mild polarization). Under S&R,
the proportion of juries with at least one juror below the 10th percentile rises to 56% with
extreme polarization, 35% with moderate polarization, and remains quite high at 30% even
under mild polarization. For comparison, a random selection would have resulted in about
73% of the juries featuring at least one such juror.
In these simulations, both procedures select fewer extreme jurors than a random draw
from the population. Somewhat surprisingly, this is not true in general. There exist dis-
tributions and values of the parameters d, p and j for which S&R selects more extreme
jurors than RAN , no matter how small the threshold below which a juror is considered as
extreme. In contrast, as we show in the next proposition, STR always selects fewer extreme
jurors than RAN .
Proposition 2. For any x ∈ {0, . . . , j − 1}, there exists c > 0 such that TSTR(x; c) <
TRAN (x; c) for all c ∈ (0, c).
21
21Proposition 2 generalizes Theorem 2 in Flanagan (2015) which shows that there always exists c > 0 such
that TSTR(n; c) < TRAN (n; c) for all c ∈ (0, c).
15






































































Note: For each set of parameters, results on the vertical axis are averages across 50,000 simulated jury
selections, fixing j = 12, d = p = 6, and C ∼ 0.5 · Ca + 0.5 · Cb throughout (with the distributions for Ca
and Cb illustrated in Figure 3). Each line illustrates the fraction of juries with at least one extreme juror,
where a juror is considered extreme if her conviction probability falls below the threshold c corresponding
to the value on the horizontal axis.
Figure 5 illustrates Proposition 2 and the fact that a similar statement does not hold
for S&R. For the simulations in the figure, we let j = d = p = 1 and adopt an extremely
polarized distribution of conviction probabilities with C ∼ 0.75 · U [0, 0.1] + 0.25 · U [0.9, 1].
In this case (as in others), STR excludes extreme jurors more often than RAN because,
for any realization of the panel, the juror with the lowest conviction probability is never
selected under STR (whereas the same juror is selected with positive probability under
RAN ). Under S&R, however, if the distribution is sufficiently right-skewed, the plaintiff is
more likely than the defendant to challenge in the first round. A challenge by the plaintiff
in the first round leads to a subgame in which only the defendant has challenges left and
the selection of an extreme juror is more likely than under a random draw. When they are
sufficiently large (i) the added probability of selecting an extreme juror when the defendant
has more challenges left than the plaintiff, coupled with (ii) the probability of a challenge
by the plaintiff in the first round can, as in the simulation depicted in Figure 5, lead to
S&R selecting more extreme jurors than RAN .
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Figure 5: Fraction of juries with at least one extreme juror (case in which S&R
is more likely to pick extreme jurors than RAN )



















Note: For each set of parameters, results on the vertical axis are averages across 50,000 simulated jury
selections, fixing j = d = p = 1, and C ∼ 0.75 · U [0, 0.1] + 0.25 · U [0.9, 1] throughout. Each line illustrates
the fraction of juries with at least one extreme juror, where a juror is considered extreme if her conviction
probability falls below the threshold c corresponding to the value on the horizontal axis.
We could not fully characterize the situations in which S&R selects more extreme jurors
than RAN , and we never observed such a situation in simulations where C is a symmet-
ric mixture of beta or uniform distributions. The example in Figure 5 (as well as other
examples we found) requires extreme skewness in the distribution, which may be viewed
as unlikely. In this sense, situations in which S&R selects more extreme jurors than RAN
might represent worst-case scenarios for S&R’s ineffectiveness at excluding extreme juror
(rather than ordinary situations).
5 Representation of minorities
In this section, we study the extent to which STR’s tendency to exclude more extreme jurors
than S&R impacts the representation of minorities under the two procedures. Without loss
of generality, we let group-a be the minority group. Since the parties do not care intrin-
sically about group-membership, any asymmetry in the use of their challenges arises from
17
heterogeneity in preferences for conviction between groups. In our simulations, we assume
that group-a is biased in favor of acquittal in the sense that Cb first-order stochastically
dominates Ca.
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As suggested by Proposition 1, which procedure better represents minorities strongly
depends on the polarization between the two groups, and the concentration of minority
jurors at the tails of the distribution of conviction probabilities. To illustrate, suppose
that d = p = j = 1 and C ∼ U [0, 1]. For this case, the distributions of conviction
probabilities for the juror selected under RAN , STR, and S&R are displayed in Figure
6(a). Consistent with Proposition 1, below some threshold c ≈ 0.25, the probability of
selecting a juror i with ci < c is lower under STR than under S&R. If the two groups
are polarized and the distribution of Ca is sufficiently concentrated below c, it follows
that STR selects a minority juror less often than S&R. But the same is not true if the
distributions lack polarization or the minority is too large. For example, decompose C as
follows: C ∼ U [0, 1] = rU [0, r] + (1− r)U [r, 1]. Since the parties only care about a juror’s
conviction probability and not about its group-membership per se, the value of r in these
decompositions does not affect the distributions of conviction probabilities for the juror
selected under RAN , STR, or S&R. Then, letting Ca ∼ U [0, r] and Cb ∼ U [r, 1], Figure
6(b) illustrates how low values of r — which concentrate minorities at the bottom of the
distribution — make S&R select more minorities than STR, whereas higher values of r —
which spread the minority over a larger range of conviction-types — make STR select more
minorities than S&R.
From this example, we see that non-overlapping group-distributions are not sufficient
to guarantee that S&R selects more minority jurors than STR. Neither is making the mi-
nority arbitrarily small. For example, regardless of the size of the minority r, concentrating
the support of the minority distribution inside the interval [0.2, 0.3] would result in STR
selecting more minority jurors, as can be seen from Panel 6(a). However, combining a small
minority with group-distributions that minimally overlap concentrates the distribution of
group-a at the tails which, as suggested by Proposition 1, makes S&R select more minorities
than STR.




22We also simulated the scenario in which the minority is biased towards conviction, the results, which we
report in the Appendix, are symmetrically very close).
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Figure 6: Jury selection and minority representation in size-1 juries













(a) Distribution of c for selected juror
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(b) Minority representation in juries
Note: For each set of parameter, results on the vertical axes are averages across 20,000 simulated jury
selections, fixing j = 1, d = p = 1, and C ∼ r ·U [0, r]+ (1− r) ·U [r, 1] throughout. The distribution in panel
(a) is independent of r whether the lines in panel (b) interpolate results from 20 values of r.
(i) ri ∈ (0, 1] for all i ∈ N with limi→∞ r
i = 0, and
(ii) Cia and C
i








b ) = 0 or
P(C∗a > C
∗
b ) = 0,
then we say that there is a vanishing minority and group-distributions that
do not overlap in the limit. For any such sequence, let AiM (x) denote the probability
that there are at least x minority jurors in the jury selected by procedure M when group-
distributions are Cia and C
i
b and the proportion of minority jurors in the population is
ri.
Proposition 3. Suppose that, under {(Cia, C
i
b, r
i)}∞i=1, there is a vanishing minority and
group distributions that do not overlap in the limit. Then for all x ∈ {1, . . . , j}, there exists




(x) for all i > j.23
23Note that, despite the argument presented in the motivating example illustrated in Figure 6, Proposition
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Table 1: Representation of Group-a when Group-a is a minority of the pool
Polarization Extreme Moderate Mild (All)
Procedure S&R STR S&R STR S&R STR RAN
Average fraction of minorities 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.25
Standard deviation 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Fraction of juries with at least 1 0.57 0.45 0.88 0.84 0.96 0.95 0.97
(a) Group-a represents 25% of the jury pool
Polarization Extreme Moderate Mild (All)
Procedure S&R STR S&R STR S&R STR RAN
Average fraction of minorities 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.10
Standard deviation 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09
Fraction of juries with at least 1 0.17 0.02 0.47 0.38 0.67 0.64 0.72
(b) Group-a represents 10% of the jury pool
Note: The rows report the average number and standard deviation of group-a jury members, and the percent
of juries with at least one group-a jurors, out of 50,000 simulations of jury selection with parameters j = 12
and d = p = 6. Conviction probabilities are drawn for from Beta(5, 1), Beta(1, 5), respectively for Group-a,
Group-b jurors (Extreme), from Beta(4, 2), Beta(2, 4) (Moderate), and from Beta(4, 3), Beta(4, 3) (Mild);
see Figure 3 for the shape of these distributions.
Given the result in Proposition 3, it is natural to wonder how small the minority and the
overlap between the group-distributions must be for S&R to select more minority jurors than
STR. When the latter is true, one may also wonder about the size of AS&R(x; r)−ASTR(x; r)
is. Again, the answer naturally depends on the model’s parameters. To inform these
questions, we ran a set of simulations with d = p = 6 and j = 12 using the distributions
displayed in Figure 3, where the green lines in each panel represent fa and the yellow lines
fb.
3 does not follow directly from Proposition 1. The reason is that, unlike in the motivating example, most of
the sequences {(Cia, C
i
b, r
i)}∞i=1 covered by Proposition 3 are such that C
i = riCia + (1− r
i)Cib varies across
the sequence (i.e., Cj 6= Ch for most j, h ∈ N).
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The results of our simulations, displayed in Table 1, suggest that S&R might select
more minority jurors than STR even when the size of the minority is relatively high (as
high as 25%) and the overlap between the group-distributions significant. However, without
stark polarization across groups,24 differences between the procedures’ propensities to select
minority jurors appear to be small. For example, under the distributions we labeled as
“extreme group heterogeneity” and with minorities representing 10% of the population, only
2.3% of juries selected by S&R include at least one minority juror whereas this number rises
to 17.1% under S&R (random selection would generate over 70% of such juries). However,
under the distributions we labeled as “mild group heterogeneity”, the same numbers become
66.5% under S&R and 64.5% under STR (random selection would generate over 71.9% of
juries with at least one minority juror in this second case).
6 Changing the number of challenges
So far, we have compared STR and S&R assuming that the number of challenges the parties
can use, d and p, was the same under each procedure. This was motivated by the fact that
judges often have a lot of freedom in selecting the procedure through which the parties use
their challenges (see Footnote 3). In contrast, the number of challenges that the parties can
use are typically specified more rigidly by state rules of criminal procedure.
In the last decades, several states have, however, reduced the number of challenges the
parties can use.25 In some instances, these reforms also clarify or alter the jury selection
procedures used in the state.26 In the context of such broader reforms, it is natural to ask
how the ability to change both the number of challenges the parties are entitled to and the
procedure through which the parties exert their challenges affect the trade-off between the
24Recall that Ca and Cb represent the parties’ beliefs that randomly drawn group-a or group-b jurors
eventually vote to convict the defendant. Polarized Ca and Cb, therefore, corresponds to groups that
are perceived by the parties to have different probabilities of voting for conviction (whether or not this
materializes when jurors actually vote on conviction at the end of the trial).
25Examples include California’s Senate Bill 843, passed in 2016, which reduces the number of challenges
a criminal defendant is entitled to from 10 to 6 (for charges carrying a maximal punishable of one year in
prison, or less).
26Examples include the 2003 reform of jury selection in Tennessee where some aspects of the jury selection
procedure were codified to apply uniformly across the state, while the number of peremptory challenges was
also slightly reduced (see Cohen and Cohen, 2003).
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Figure 7: The effect of varying the number of challenges




















(a) Fraction of extreme jurors





















(b) Fraction of minority jurors
Note: Fraction of juries with at least one juror below the 10th percentile (left panel) and fraction of minority
jurors (right panel). For each set of parameters, results on the vertical axes are averages across 50,000
simulated jury selections, fixing j = 12 and C ∼ 0.2 · Ca + 0.8 · Cb throughout (with the distributions for
Ca ∼ Beta(2, 4) and Cb ∼ Beta(4, 2), see Figure 3(b)). The values of d = p are on the horizontal axes.
exclusion of extreme jurors and the representation of minorities.
Throughout this section, we fix an arbitrary value of j and consider varying d = p. For
any procedure M , let M -y denote the version of M when d = p = y. The notation for
the two previous sections then carries over, with TM -y(x; c) denoting the probability that
at least x jurors with conviction probability below c are selected under M -y, and AM -y(x)
the probability that at least x minority jurors are selected under M -y.27
For illustration purposes, we first consider the case C ∼ 0.2·Ca+0.8·Cb, Ca ∼ Beta(2, 4)
and Cb ∼ Beta(4, 2) (Ca and Cb are illustrated in the Figure 3(b)), and consider a juror
as extreme if its conviction probability falls in the bottom 10th percentile of C (which here
equals 0.27). Unsurprisingly, the fraction of juries with at least one extreme jurors decreases
27Again, in the case of extreme jurors, we focus on jurors who qualify as extreme because their conviction
probability falls below a certain threshold c, though all of our results hold symmetrically for jurors who
qualify as extreme because their conviction probability lies above a certain threshold c,
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as the number of challenges awarded to the parties increases, regardless of the procedure
that is used (Figure 7(a)). Conversely, the fraction of minority jurors decreases with the
number of challenges under both procedures (Figure 7(b)). In other words, for both STR
and S&R, more challenges lead to fewer extreme jurors being selected at the expense of a
worse representation of minorities.
As Figure 7(a) illustrates, however, increasing the number of challenges decreases the
selection of extreme jurors much faster under STR than under S&R. As a consequence, for
all values of y ∈ {2, . . . , 18}, there exists w < y such that STR-w performs better than
S&R-y in terms of both objectives.28
The latter is not true in general. Even when there exists w such that STR-w better
represents minorities than S&R-y, STR-w might still exclude fewer extreme jurors than
S&R-y if jurors are considered extreme when their conviction probability falls below an
arbitrary c > 0. However, an extension of Proposition 1 shows that when such a w exists,
there also exists c > 0 such that if jurors are considered extreme when their conviction
probability falls below c, STR-w performs better than S&R-y in terms of both objectives.
Proposition 4. Consider any x ∈ {1, . . . , j} and any y ≥ 1. Suppose that there exists
w ≥ 1 such that ASTR-w(x) > AS&R-y(x). Then for some c > 0, we also have TSTR-w(x; c) <
TS&R-y(x; c) for all c ∈ (0, c).
7 Empirical evidence
As emphasized in the analysis so far, group asymmetries in jury representation exist to the
extent that groups have polarized preferences for conviction. In this section, we use jury se-
lection data to estimate the distribution of conviction probabilities and provide quantitative
evidence of the effect of jury selection procedures and their differences.
Jury selection data is to our knowledge relatively scarce.29 For the purposes of this
Section, we exploit data from Craft (2018) on peremptory strikes in the Fifth Circuit Court
28Specifically, in this example, for any y ∈ {2, . . . , 18}, there exists w ∈ {1, . . . , y−1} such that ASTR-w(1) >
AS&R-y(1) and TSTR-w(1; 0.27) < TS&R-y(1; 0.27)).
29Besides the data used in this section, another important source is the data of jury selection in North
Carolina described in Wright et al. (2018) and analyzed in Flanagan (2018). We do not use this source
because the jury selection procedures adopted in these jurisdictions do not conform to the rules we study in
this paper.
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District of Mississippi from 1992 to 2017, where a version of STR was used to select jurors.30
For the vast majority of trials, 12 jurors were selected with 6 challenges available to each
party.31 For each trial, the data reports the race and gender of the potential jurors, whether
a juror was struck by the defendant or the state, and the race and gender composition of
the seated jury and alternate jurors. This allows the computation of jury composition by
race, and the computation of challenges by race for each party.
We limit our analysis to the juries’ racial composition focusing on Black andWhite jurors
only32. Assuming that the distributions of conviction probabilities in each group belong to
the class of beta distributions, the model parameters are five: the fraction of whites in the
jury pool, 1− r, which we directly observe in the data, and the four parameters of fBlacks,
fWhites. The data we observe does not allow to identify both of these distributions. Given
r, for any given fBlacks = Beta(αa, βa), it is always possible to find fWhites = Beta(αb, βb)
that replicates the same proportion of whites struck by the defendant and by the State
of Mississippi, the plaintiff (which in turn determine the fraction of whites in the jury).
Intuitively, the reason behind this lack of identification is that it is possible to shift some
mass of both distributions to the right without changing, on average, the racial composition
of the juries.33. While this shift would cause the conviction frequency at trial to change,
using this moment for identification would not change the outcomes we focus on in this
paper for STR (see Footnote 34).
In Table 2 we report some summary statistics from the data. The sample contains 292
trials, of which 229 include black defendants. We exclude all jurors dismissed by the judge
for causes that are not the focus of our analysis. Hence, we define the size of the panel as the
sum of the number of jurors, alternate jurors, and jurors dismissed by either the state or the
30While the adopted procedure differs in some details from the stylized version we analyzed in this paper,
we assume that in equilibrium, its outcome conforms to that of STR. In addition, the number of jurors
selected and the number of challenges available sometimes differ by type of trial.
31As we explain below, there is some variation to the number of jurors in the data and to the number
of challenges used by parties (due to variation in the kind of offenses being prosecuted as well as in judges
decisions in the allocation of additional challenges for the selection of alternate jurors). However, the
moments we use for identification rely only on race ratios and are relative stable across juries of different
size.
32The full sample includes almost 15,000 jurors, of which 26% are Black, 42% are White, 32% are of
unknown race, and only 3 Latinos and 1 Asian which we pool with the Whites.
33With beta distributions, matching these two moments also matches the proportion of juries with x jurors
of a given race, for all x ∈ {0, . . . , j}, making it impossible to use higher moments for identification.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Sample selection (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Defendant White Black Black Black Black
Size of jury pool Any Any ≤ 27 Any ≤ 27
Include unknown race jurors Yes Yes Yes No No
N. of Trials 63 229 162 131 99
Trial statistics
Average size of jury pool 26.1 26.9 23.7 26.2 23.5
(std) (5.0) (5.8) (2.5) (5.7) (2.6)
Average size of jury 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
(std) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2) (0.2)
% with unknown race in jury pool 31.2 30.7 26.9 0.0 0.0
Percentage of whites∗
in jury pool 63.1 62.7 63.1 66.5 65.9
in jury 61.0 66.8 67.8 70.5 69.7
among struck by the defendant 86.2 91.4 92.3 93.1 92.9
among struck by the state 40.8 23.6 21.4 23.5 21.6
Standard deviation in parenthesis. ∗Percentage of white jurors in samples (1), (2), and (3) computed among
jurors that have been classified as either whites or blacks
defendant. There is some variation in the size of both the juries and the panel, in part due
to the fact that the process of selecting alternate jurors is separate. Unfortunately, the data
does not distinguish between jurors who were dismissed in the course of selecting regular
jurors, or in the course of alternates. We present data for 5 samples that vary depending
on the race of the defendant, the size of the panel, and whether or not we include panels
containing jurors of unknown race. These show that the racial composition of juries and
challenges is affected by the the race of the defendant but is only weakly affected by the
way we select our sample.
The average size of the jury (excluding alternates) is 12 in all samples, though the panels
are slightly over 24, mainly because they include potential alternate jurors (and because, in
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Figure 8: Counterfactual analysis: Juries with at least one extreme juror





















Note: For each set of parameters, results on the vertical axis are averages across 50,000 simulated jury
selections, fixing j = 12, d = p = 6, and C ∼ 0.341 · Ca + 0.659 · Cb throughout (with the distributions for
Ca ∼ Beta(2, 4) and Cb ∼ Beta(5.80, 3.95)). Each line illustrates the fraction of juries with at least one
extreme juror, where a juror is considered extreme if her conviction probability falls below the threshold c
corresponding to the value on the horizontal axis.
some cases, judges may grant additional challenges to the parties). Challenge behavior is
affected by the race of the defendant: Juries with black defendants have a higher percentage
of whites than the panel does, whereas juries with white defendants include fewer whites.
When the defendant is black the defense challenges a higher fraction of white jurors, and the
state a higher fraction of black jurors. Variation in the size of the jury pool has little impact
on the racial composition of the juries or challenged jurors (for either party). Focusing on
trials with Black defendants, the fraction of whites in the pool is quite stable across all 5
samples (between 62.7 and 66.5 percent). This is predicted by our theory when jurors have
polarized views that favor defendants of their own race. The behavior of the parties differ
substantially by race: in sample (5), which we use to estimate our model, 93% of the jurors
struck by the defendant are white, whereas only 22% of the jurors struck by the state are
White. We use these two moments to estimate the distribution of conviction probabilities.
We proceed by assuming fBlacks = Beta(2, 4), and compute the parameters of fWhites to
match the fraction of white jurors struck by the defendant and the plaintiff (the last two
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Figure 9: Counterfactual analysis: Number of challenges



















(a) Fraction of extreme jurors






















(b) Fraction of minority jurors
Note: Fraction of juries with at least one juror below the 10th percentile (left panel) and fraction of minority
jurors (right panel). For each set of parameters, results on the vertical axes are averages across 50,000
simulated jury selections, fixing j = 12, d = p = 6, and C ∼ 0.341 · Ca + 0.659 · Cb throughout (with the
distributions for Ca ∼ Beta(2, 4) and Cb ∼ Beta(5.80, 3.95)). Values of d = p are on the horizontal axes.
moments of Table 2) using sample (5). The estimated parameters of fWhites are (alpha =
5.80, beta = 3.95), with standard errors (1.00, 0.85).34
Figure 8 reports the results of simulations computed with the estimated parameters. The
figure reveals that the procedure adopted by this jurisdiction — a version of STR where
each party is allowed 6 challenges — is much more effective at excluding extreme jurors
than a counterfactual S&R. The adopted procedure excludes nearly every juror below the
10-th percentile, c = 0.21, whereas S&R with the same number of challenges would produce
about 27% juries with at least one juror more extreme than 0.21.
Figure 9 however suggests that a change to S&R could improve the representation of
34 Standard errors computed by bootstrapping 200 replications of the data set. We also tried assuming a
left-skewed fBlacks = Beta(10, 6), which results in fWhites = Beta(23.37, 6.71). For STR, the results obtained
with these alternative distributions are almost identical to the ones reported in Figure 9. S&R selects about
the same number of minorities across all number of challenges, but is capable of excluding fewer jurors below
the 10th percentile by about 7 percentage points.
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minorities. Keeping the number of challenges at 6, S&R would include 6% more minorities
than STR (about 27% vs 25%) and would produce a jury with 4 black jurors (about the
same as the black representation in the jury pool) 12% more often (about 41% vs 37%). To
reach a similar representation, the number of challenges in STR would have to be reduced
to 4, though this would increase the fraction of juries with jurors below the 10th percentile
from almost zero to 4.4%.
This analysis suggests that the data is consistent with the parties believing in a distribu-
tion that makes the two procedures significantly different in their ability to exclude jurors.
The data is also consistent with beliefs in sizeable heterogeneity between juror-groups which,
in turn, implies that the procedures also differ in their ability to select of minorities as well.
8 Extensions
8.1 Excluding unbalanced juries
The primary purpose of jury selection is to prevent extreme potential jurors from serving on
the effective jury (see Footnote 1 and its associated quote). In our model, it seems natural
to interpret this goal as that of limiting the selection of jurors coming from the tail of the
distribution. This is the interpretation of extreme that we have studied thus far.
Although it is perhaps less clear that it aligns with the goals of practitioners, another
approach could be to consider the extremism of juries as a whole. For example, extreme
juries could be viewed as juries in which the juror with the highest or lowest conviction
probability is extreme. Through variants of the arguments in the proofs of Propositions 1
and 2, one can show that, in that sense too, STR is more effective than both S&R and RAN
at excluding extreme juries.35
Another measure of juries’ extremism, proposed by Flanagan (2015), is whether a jury
is excessively “unbalanced” in the sense of featuring a disproportionate proportion of ju-
rors coming from one side of the median of C. Interestingly, Flanagan shows that STR
introduces correlation between the selected jurors, which leads the procedure to select more
unbalanced juries than RAN . Even though panels are the result of independent draws from
35Specifically, for any x ∈ {0, . . . , j − 1}, there exists c > 0 and c̄ < 1, such that (a) for every c ∈ (0, c),
the probability that the lowest conviction-probability in the jury is smaller than c is larger under S&R and
RAN than under STR, and (b) for every c ∈ (c̄, 1), the probability that the highest conviction-probability
in the jury is larger than c is larger under S&R and RAN than under STR.
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the population, jurors selected under STR have conviction probabilities between that of
the lowest and highest challenged juror. For example, the selection of two jurors with
conviction probabilities 0.25 and 0.75 indicates that challenges were used on jurors with
conviction probabilities outside the [0.25, 0.75] range. The latter makes it more likely that
STR selected additional jurors in the [0.25, 0.75], thereby introducing a correlation between
the selected jurors.
This intuition is formalized in Corollary 2 of Flanagan (2015) which shows that, even
when the parties have the same number of challenges (d = p), the probability that all
selected jurors come from one side of the median is larger under STR than under RAN .
Our next proposition generalizes this result. Using a new proof technique, we show that for
any x larger than half the jury-size, the probability of selecting at least x jurors from one
side of the median is larger under STR than under RAN . Similar to Section 4, we focus for
brevity on the probability that the selected jurors are below the median. All our results are
however symmetrical and apply identically to the probability of selecting jurors above the
median. Let med[C] denote the median of C.
Proposition 5. If d = p, then for any x ∈ {n/2 + 1, . . . , n} if n is even, and any x ∈









Figure 10 illustrates Proposition 5 and that a similar statement does not hold for S&R.
For M ∈ {STR,RAN}, the value of TM (x;med[C]) can be computed analytically and does
not depend on the distribution of C.36 For M = S&R, the value of TM (x;med[C]) depends
on the distribution in a complex fashion and it is not possible to generally compare S&R
with the two other procedures in terms of TM (x;med[C]). As the figure illustrates, the
probability to select at least x jurors below med[C] can, in some cases (in the figure, x = 7
and, barely, x = 8 jurors), be larger under S&R than under both RAN and STR. In other
cases, however, the same probability is lower under S&R than under both RAN and STR.
Figure 10 displays the result of simulations when the distribution of C is highly polarized
(a mixture of Beta(1, 5) and Beta(5, 1)) In Appendix B we present additional simulations
for less polarized distributions. These additional simulations suggest that high levels of











= P(Bi[j + d + p, 0.5] ≥
x+ p).
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Figure 10: Selection of jurors below the median
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S&R, r = .25
S&R, r = .5
Note: Fraction of juries with a at least given number of jurors below the median of C under STR (green
dashed line) and S&R (continuous lines) relative to the same fraction under RAN (i.e. TM (x;med[C]) −
T
RAN
(x;med[C])). Throughout, we fix j = 12, d = p = 6 and C ∼ r · Beta(1, 5) + (1 − r) · Beta(5, 1) (for
r ∈ {0.1, 0.25, 0.5}) whereas the number of jurors below the median is on the horizontal axis. For each set
of parameters, results for S&R are averages across 50,000 simulated jury selections, whereas values for RAN
and STR are computed analytically and are independent of r (see Footnote 36).
than STR. Also, for lower levels of polarization, S&R more often selects fewer juries made
of a majority of jurors below the median than RAN .37
8.2 Representation of balanced groups
Concerns about the effect of jury selection on group-representation often focus on the repre-
sentation of racial minorities. Thought the U.S. Supreme Court initially banned challenges
based on race in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), it later also banned challenges based on gender
in J.E.B. v. Alabama (1994). In this context, it is natural to ask whether the advantages
of S&R in terms of minority representation comes at the cost of a worse representation of
gender groups.
37Because the parties’ actions under S&R are influenced by the mean of the distribution but not in any
clear way by the median (and because of the complexity of the game tree), we were unable to formalize the
effect of polarization on these comparisons in terms of the model parameters.
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Unlike minorities which correspond to groups of unequal sizes represented by small
values of r, gender-groups can be thought of as even-sized groups and are better modeled
using r ≈ 0.5. With groups of similar sizes, both procedures almost always select at least
a few members from either group. It is therefore more interesting to compare procedures
in terms of the proportion of group-a jurors they select (than in terms of the probability of
selecting at least x members from group-a, as we did before).
In this last section, we let r = 0.5 and study the expected proportion of group-a jurors
selected under STR and S&R. We denote these proportions rSTR and rS&R and focus on how
close rSTR and rS&R are from the 50% of group-a jurors that prevail in the population.
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As in the last two sections, it is not possible to generally compare STR and S&R in
terms of the procedures’ ability to select an even proportion of group-a and group-b jurors.
In some cases, rSTR can be further away from 50% than rS&R, and the converse may be
true in other cases. For example, with d = p = 6 and j = 12, if Ca ∼ U [0, 1] and
Cb ∼ Beta(1, 5), simulations reveal that rSTR = 43.7% whereas rS&R = 45.8%. In contrast,
when Ca ∼ Beta[4, 2] and Cb ∼ Beta(1, 5), rSTR = 50.3% whereas rS&R = 52.2%.
These two examples however suggest that, as the group distributions become more
symmetrical, rSTR get closer to 50% . Our next proposition confirms this pattern. If the
group-distributions are symmetric or if they do not overlap, and if d = p, then rSTR = 50%
whereas S&R does not necessarily select an even proportion of jurors from each group. The
latter follows from the fact that, even when r = 50% and distributions are symmetrical, the
multiplicative utility function that the parties use to assess the value of a jury (which is itself
a consequence of the fact that juries must reach unanimous decisions) creates asymmetries
in the use of challenges under S&R.39
We say that random variables Ca and Cb are symmetric if fa(c) = fb(1 − c) for all
c ∈ [0, 1].
38Previous results are stronger in the sense that they establish a first-order stochastic dominance between
the number of jurors with certain characteristics (extremism or group-membership) selected under STR
and S&R. As we explain after Proposition 1, showing, for example, that TSTR(x; c) < TS&R(x; c) for all
x ∈ {1, . . . , j} directly implies that the expected proportion of selected jurors with conviction probability
ci < c is lower under STR than under S&R (whereas the converse is not true).
39Flanagan (2015) shows that, in this symmetrical case, the asymmetry of the payoffs still forces the
defendant to be more conservative than the plaintiff when using its challenges, hence leading to an uneven
selection of jurors from the two groups.
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Proposition 6. Suppose that r = 0.5 and d = p. If (a) the two group distribution do not
overlap,40 or (b) Ca and Cb are symmetric, then rSTR = rRAN .
Table 3(a) illustrates Proposition 6 and the fact that a similar statement does not hold
for S&R. Unlike STR, S&R can select unequal numbers of group-a and group-b jurors
even when distributions are symmetrical across groups. Therefore, as a consequence of
Proposition 6, rS&R can in these cases be further away than rSTR from the 50% of group-a
jurors that prevail in the population.
Table 3(a) however suggests that these differences may be quantitatively small, and that
sizable differences may require high levels of polarization between groups. Table 3(b) and
3(c) also report the results of simulations in which the symmetries required for Proposition 6
to hold are slightly relaxed. These indicate that the advantage of STR in the representation
of balanced groups established in Proposition 6 (i.e., the fact that rSTR is closer to 50%
than rS&R) may not be robust to even mild relaxations of these symmetries. In particular,
when r = 0.45, rSTR is consistently closer than rS&R to the 55% of group−a that prevail in
the population (see Table 1). Also, when r = 0.5 but the group-distributions are slightly
asymmetric, rS&R are identical except in the most polarized case.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the relative performance of two stylized jury-selection procedures.
Strike and Replace presents potential jurors one-by-one to the parties, whereas the Struck
procedure presents all potential jurors before they exercise vetoes. When jurors differ in
their probability of voting for the defendant’s conviction, and on group membership, we
show that when groups have polarized views Strike is more effective at excluding jurors
with extreme views, but generally selects fewer members of a minority group than Strike
and Replace, leading to a conflict between these two goals.
Sociologists Small and Pager (2020) argue that systemic factors may lead to disparate
outcomes even in the absence of taste-based or statistical discrimination, the traditional
explanations provided in Economic Theory. This paper formalizes an example in which the
pursuit of one legitimate objective — preventing extreme jurors to serve on juries — may
40That is either P(Ca > Cb) = 0 or P(Cb > Ca) = 0. The same result would apply if the two distributions
did not overlap in the limit as in Proposition 3.
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Table 3: Representation of Group-a jurors with balanced group sizes
Polarization Extreme Moderate Mild (All)
Procedure S&R STR S&R STR S&R STR RAN
Average fraction of minorities 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Standard deviation 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.14
(a) Group-a proportion r = 0.5, group distributions as in Figure 3.
Polarization Extreme Moderate Mild (All)
Procedure S&R STR S&R STR S&R STR RAN
Average fraction of minorities 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.45 0.44 0.45
Standard deviation 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.14
(b) Group-a proportion r = 0.45, group distributions as in Figure 3.
Polarization Extreme∗ Moderate∗ Mild∗ (All)
Procedure S&R STR S&R STR S&R STR RAN
Average fraction of minorities 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.50
Standard deviation 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.14
(c) Group-a proportion r = 0.5, group distributions slightly asymmetric∗
∗In panel (c) Extreme∗ corresponds to Ca ∼ Beta(1, 5) and Cb ∼ Beta(5, 2), Moderate
∗ to Ca ∼ Beta(2, 4)
and Cb ∼ Beta(4, 3), and Mild
∗ to Ca ∼ Beta(3, 4) and Cb ∼ Beta(4, 4).
Note: The rows report the average number and standard deviation of group-a jury members out of 50,000
simulations of jury selection with parameters j = 12 and d = p = 6.
lead to group disparities.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Preliminary technical results
A.1.1 Limit of a ratio of binomial probabilities
Lemma 1. For all η ∈ N and any k ∈ {1, . . . , η − 1},
lim
π→0
P[Bi(η, π) = k]
P[Bi(η, π) > k]
= ∞.
Proof. Using the standard formula for the p.d.f. of a binomial and the representation of the
c.d.f. of the binomial with regularized incomplete beta function, we can re-write the ratio as
P[Bi(η, π) = k]

















































[(−1) · (1− π)η−k−1πk]
=
kπk−1(1− π)η−k
(η − k)(1− π)η−k−1πk
+
πk(η − k)(1− π)η−k−1








A.1.2 Continuity of challenge thresholds in S&R as Ci converges in distribution
Lemma 2. Consider a sequence of random variables {Ci}∞i=1 that converges in distribution
to some random variable C∗. Let tI(γ, C
i
)
denote the challenge threshold used by party I ∈
{D,P} in an arbitrary subgame γ of S&R when the distribution of conviction probabilities





Proof. In any subgame γ̃, tI(γ̃, C
i
)
is the ratio of the value of continuation subgames if I
challenges the presented juror, or if both parties abstain from challenging (Brams and Davis,
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∗) follows directly if we show that the value of
any subgame, which we denote V (γ, Ci
)
, converges to V (γ, C∗) as i tends to infinity.41
The latter follows directly from the recursive characterization of V (γ, Ci
)
in Brams and
Davis (1978). Recall that each subgame γ can be characterized by the number of jurors
κ that remain to be selected, the number of challenges left to the defendant δ, and the
number of challenges left to the plaintiff π. With this notation, the recursive proof that
for all κ, δ, π ≥ 0, V
(




[κ, δ, π], Ci
)
as i tends to infinity can be
decomposed in a number of cases. Let F i(c) denote the the c.d.f. of Ci, F ∗(c) the c.d.f.
of C∗, and F (c) the c.d.f. of an arbitrary distribution C, with µi, µ∗, and µj being the
corresponding expected values. In each step, the initial formula for V
(
[κ, δ, π], Ci
)
is taken
from Brams and Davis (1978).
Case 1: κ = 0, δ ≥ 0, π ≥ 0. In this case, V
(
[0, δ, π], C) = 1 for all C and the
convergence of V
(




[0, δ, π], C∗) follows trivially.
Case 2: κ > 0, δ = 0, π = 0. In this case, V
(
[κ, 0, 0], C) = µκ for all C and the
convergence of V
(




[0, δ, π], C∗) follows from the fact that Ci converges in
distribution to C∗.
Case 3: κ > 0, δ = 0, π > 0. In this case, for all C,
V
(








and tI([κ, 0, π], C) = V
(
[κ, 0, π−1], C)/V
(
[κ−1, 0, π], C). The convergence of V
(




[κ, 0, π], C∗) then follows recursively from the previous cases and from Ci converging
in distribution to C∗.
Case 4: κ > 0, δ > 0, π = 0. In this case, for all C,
V
(
[κ, δ, 0], C) = V
(
[κ, δ − 1, 0], C)− V
(




where tD([κ, δ, 0], C) = V
(
[κ, δ−1, 0], C)/V
(
[κ−1, δ, 0], C). The convergence of V
(




[κ, δ, π], C∗) then follows recursively from the previous cases and from Ci converging
in distribution to C∗.
41Because we assume that all distributions of conviction probabilities are continuous, there are no issues
related to the possibility for the bottom of one of these ratios to converge to zero.
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Case 5: κ > 0, δ > 0, π > 0. In this case, for all C,
V
(
[κ, δ, π], C) = V
(
[κ, δ − 1, π], C)− V
(




where tD([κ, δ, π], C) = V
(
[κ, δ − 1, π], C)/V
(
[κ − 1, δ, π], C) and and tI([κ, δ, π], C) =
V
(
[κ, δ, π − 1], C)/V
(
[κ − 1, δ, π], C). The convergence of V
(




[κ, δ, 0], C∗)
then follows recursively from the previous cases and from Ci converging in distribution to
C∗.

A.1.3 Comparative statics of probabilities from a symmetric binomial
Lemma 3. P[Bi(η + 2, 0.5) ≥ k + 1] > P[Bi(η, 0.5) ≥ k] if and only if k > η2 +
1
2 .
Proof. We can decompose P[Bi(η + 2, 0.5) ≥ k + 1] in terms of Bi(η, 0.5) and Bi(2, 0.5):
P[Bi(η + 2, 0.5) ≥ k + 1]
= P[Bi(η, 0.5) ≥ k + 1] + P[Bi(η, 0.5) = k] ∗ P[Bi(2, 0.5) ≥ 1] +
P[Bi(η, 0.5) = k − 1] ∗ P[Bi(2, 0.5) = 2]
= P[Bi(η, 0.5) ≥ k + 1] + P[Bi(η, 0.5) = k] ∗ 0.75 + P[Bi(η, 0.5) = k − 1] ∗ 0.25
Also,
P[Bi(η, 0.5) ≥ k] = P[Bi(η, 0.5) ≥ k + 1] + P[Bi(η, 0.5) = k].
Together, the last two equalities imply that P[Bi(η + 2, 0.5) ≥ k + 1] > P[Bi(η, 0.5) ≥ k]
if and only if
P[Bi(η, 0.5) = k] ∗ 0.75 + P[Bi(η, 0.5) = k − 1] ∗ 0.25 > P[Bi(η, 0.5) = k]
P[Bi(η, 0.5) = k − 1] ∗ 0.25 > P[Bi(η, 0.5) = k] ∗ 0.25


































A.1.4 Relationship between order statistics of symmetric distributions
For any number of draws w and any k ≤ w, let Ck,wg denote the k-th order statistic out of
w draws from distribution Cg, and f
k,w
g (x) the corresponding probability density function.
Lemma 4. Suppose that Ca and Cb are symmetric. Then, for any w ∈ N and any k ∈
{1, . . . , w}, we have fk,wa (c) = f
w−k+1,w
b (1− c) for all c ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Recall that, by definition, Ca and Cb being symmetric implies fa(c) = fb(1− c) for
all c ∈ [0, 1], which, in turn, implies Fa(c) = Fb(1− c) for all c ∈ [0, 1]. We therefore have,













fb(1− c)[1− Fb(1− c)]





fb(1− c)[1− Fb(1− c)]
k−1[fb(1− c)]
w−k
= (w − k + 1)
w!
(w − k + 1)!(k − 1)!
fb(1− c)[(1− Fb(1− c)]
k−1[Fb(1− c)]
w−k
= (w − k + 1)
w!
(w − k + 1)!(w − (w − k + 1)!
fb(1− c)[1− Fb(1− c)]
k−1[Fb(1− c)]
w−k
= (w − k + 1)
(
w
w − k + 1
)
fb(1− c)[1− Fb(1− c)]
k−1[Fb(1− c)]
w−k
= fw−k+1b (1− c)
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A.2 Section 4: Effectiveness at excluding extremes
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider an arbitrary c ∈ (0, 1) and let us refer to jurors with conviction probability no
larger than c as extreme jurors. Let TM (x; c|k) denote the probability that at least x
extreme jurors are selected by procedure M conditional on there being exactly k of extreme
jurors in the panel of n. By the Law of Total Probability,











TM (x; c|k). (2)
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Consider first the STR procedure. Note that for all c, we have TSTR(x; c|x) = 0 because
if there are exactly x extreme jurors in the panel, one of them is necessarily challenged by





















where the last inequality follows from the fact that TSTR(x; c|k) ∈ [0, 1] for all k (as
TSTR(x; c|k) is a probability).
Next, consider procedure S&R. Our goal is to construct a lower bound for the probability
of selecting an extreme juror and show that, as c → 0, this lower bound does not converge
to 0 as fast as (3). To do so, we introduce an decreasing function σ(c) > 0 such that, when
c is sufficiently small, TS&R(x; c|k) ≥ σ(c) for any k ≥ x. To construct σ, consider the
restricted sample space in which there are k extreme jurors in the panel.
Let tP be the lowest challenge threshold used by the plaintiff in any subgame of the
S&R procedure. Clearly, tP > 0.
42 Henceforth, we focus on c ∈ (0, tP ).
We first consider the function α(c) defined as the probability that cj ∈ (c, tP ) for all the
(n− k) non-extreme jurors in the panel. Because C is continuous and 0 is the lower-bound
of its support, there exists y > 0 sufficiently small such that α(c) > 0 for all c ∈ [0, y].43
Also, α(c) is weakly decreasing in c.
By construction of tP , for such panels (with k extreme jurors and cj ∈ (c, tP ) for all the
(n − k) non-extreme jurors), the plaintiff uses all its challenges on the p first jurors it is
presented with, and the defendant never uses any challenges.44 Therefore, for these panels,
the probability that all k extreme jurors are selected is the probability that none of these











42Formally, if Γ denotes the set of subgames of S&R and tP (γ) the plaintiff’s challenge threshold in any
subgame γ ∈ Γ, then tP = minγ∈Γ tp(γ) (the minimum is well-defined since Γ is of finite size). In any
subgame γ of S&R, there is always a conviction probability c > 0 low enough such that if the juror who is
presented to the parties in the first round of γ is of type c, the plaintiff will challenge that juror. Therefore,
tP > 0.
43By definition of the support, because 0 is the lower-bound of the support, P(C ∈ [0, ǫ]) > 0 for all ǫ > 0.
Because C is continuous, there must therefore exists some δ > 0 such that P(C ∈ [δ/2, δ]) > 0. We then
have α(c) > 0 for all c < δ.
44The latter follows from the fact that, in any subgame, the threshold used by the defendant is always
higher than the threshold used by the plaintiff (in equilibrium, the defendant and the plaintiff never both
want to challenge the presented juror).
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Applying TS&R(x; c|k) ≥ σ(c) to (2) with M = S&R, we obtain for all c sufficiently












































] = ∞, (5)
where the last equality follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that σ(c) > 0 is decreasing
in c.45 In turn, limc→0 TS&R(x; c)/TSTR(x; c) = ∞ and the fact that limc→0 TS&R(x; c) =
limc→0 TSTR(x; c) = 0 together imply implies that there exists some c > 0 small enough
such that TSTR(x; c) < TS&R(x; c) for all c ∈ (0, c).
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Using the same notation as in the proof of Proposition 1, we have








∗ TRAN(x; c|x). (6)
Note that TRAN(x; c|x) is the probability that an Hypergeometric random variable with x
success, n − x failures, and j draws, results in the draw of exactly x successes. Therefore,
























where the last equality follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that TRAN(x; c|x) > 0. The
result then follows as in the proof of Proposition 1.
45To apply Lemma 1, note that because C is continuous and the lower-bound of the support of C is 0, we
have F (c) > 0 for all c > 0 and limc→0 F (c) = 0.
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A.3 Section 5: Representation of minorities
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 3
The structure of the proof is similar to that of the previous propositions. We focus on the





b) = 0. The proof for the other case is symmetrical.
For now, consider arbitrary Cia, C
i
b, and r








(x) by conditioning on the number of
minority jurors in the panel.
First, consider STR and let us decompose Ai
STR
(x) conditional, on the one hand, on the





, and on the other, on the panel containing exactly x minority jurors — which occurs
with probability P
[
Bi(n, ri) = x
]
. In the first case (i.e., more than x minority jurors in the
panel), the probability that the panel contains at least x minority jurors is an upper bound
on the probability that STR selects them. In the second case (i.e., exactly x minority
jurors in the panel), STR selects at least x minority jurors provided that none of the
minority jurors in the panel are challenged. This occurs with a probability no larger than
the probability that the lowest conviction-probability among minorities is larger than the p-
th conviction probability among majority jurors (since the latter is required for the plaintiff
not to challenge any of the minority jurors in the panel). Recall that for any number of
draws w and any k ≤ w, we let Ck,wg denote the k-th order statistic out of w draws from





























Second, consider S&R. Clearly, Ai
S&R
(x) is no smaller than the probability for S&R
to select at least x minority jurors when there are exactly x minority jurors in the panel.
The latter is equal to P
[
Bi(n, ri) = x
]
∗ σ(x; ri, Cia, C
i




probability that S&R selects x minority jurors conditional on having x minority jurors in
the panel, as a function of ri, Cia, and C
i





Bi(n, ri) = x
]




We now show that limi→∞ σ(x; r
i, Cia, C
i
b) > 0. For all i ∈ N, let C
i = riCia+(1− r
i)Cib.
Observe that because limi→∞ ri = 0 and because C
i




converges in distribution to C∗b . By Lemma 2, this implies that for any subgame γ of S&R












the interior of the support of C∗b for both I ∈ {D,P}. Also recall that in the limit, the
supports of Cia and C
i




b ) = 0. Therefore, in the limit,
the defendant never challenges a minority juror, which in turn implies that
(a) as i tends to infinity, the probability that the defendant challenges one of the x minority





lies in the interior of the support of C∗b for both I ∈ {D,P}, there is
also a range of conviction probabilities [c, c] low enough inside the support of C∗b such that
P (C∗b ∈ [c, c]) > 0 and P challenged the juror presented in subgame γ if her conviction
probability lies within [c, c]. Furthermore, the probability that a juror with conviction-
probability in [c, c] is a majority juror is strictly positive (and tends to one as i tends to
infinity). Overall, in the limit,
(b) the probability that the plaintiff challenges a majority juror presented in subgame γ is
strictly positive.
Combining (a) and (b), in the limit and given a panel containing x minority jurors, there
is a positive probability that p majority jurors are presented first, are all challenged by P ,
and are followed by the xminority jurors which are left unchallenged by the parties (resulting

































Bi(n, ri) = x
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Bi(n, ri) = x
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸





















































(x) for all i > j.
A.4 Section 2: Changing the number of challenges
A.4.1 Proof of Proposition 4
The structure of the proof is similar to that of the previous propositions. Observe that (3)
and (4) are true regardless of the number of challenges awarded to the parties in STR or
S&R. That is, by the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1, the following two











































The proposition then follows from the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1 (in
particular, see (5)).
46Recall that the proposition assumes w, y ≥ 1.
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A.5 Section 8: Extensions: Unbalanced juries and representation of bal-
anced groups
A.5.1 Proof of Proposition 5
The probability that STR selects at least x jurors with conviction-probability above the
median is the probability that at least x + d of the jurors in the panel have conviction-
probability above the median (since d of these jurors are challenged by the defendant).





= P [Bi(j + d+ p, 0.5) ≥ x+ d] = P [Bi(j + 2d, 0.5) ≥ x+ d]





= P [Bi(j, 0.5) ≥ x].









. Since n is integer-valued, the last inequality corresponds to x ≥ n/2 + 1
if n is even and x ≥ n/2 + 1.5 if n is odd.
A.5.2 Proof of Proposition 6
Part (a). Under STR, since the group-distributions do not overlap, each party first uses all
of its challenges on one of the two groups before challenging the lowest conviction probability
jurors from the other group. For concreteness and without loss of generality, suppose that
group a favors the defendant (i.e., P(Ca > Cb) = 0). Let m denote the number of jurors
from group-a in the panel.
Note that because r = 0.5, the probability that m = k is the same as the probability
that m = n−k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊n/2⌋}. Also, because d = p, the number of group-a jurors
who are selected when m = k is equal to the number of group-b jurors who are selected
when m = n − k.47 Therefore, the expected number of group-a jurors in the jury selected
by STR is exactly j/2.
47First, suppose that k ≤ p. Then, if m = k, no jurors from group-a (and j jurors from group-b)
are selected, whereas if m = n − k, no jurors from group-b (and j jurors from group-a) are selected.
Second, suppose that k ∈ {p + 1, . . . , ⌊n/2⌋}. Then, if m = k, k − p = k − d jurors from group-a (and
j − (k − p) = j − (k − d) jurors from group-a) are selected, whereas if m = n− k, k − d = k − p jurors from
group-b (and j − (k − d) = j − (k − p) jurors from group-b) are selected.
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Part (b). The proof is similar to the proof of Part (a). Consider the set of panel
configurations {a, b}n where, for example, vector (a, b, a, . . . , b, b, b) ∈ {a, b}n indicates that
the juror with the lowest conviction probability in the panel is a group-a juror, the juror
with second-lowest conviction probability is a group-b juror, the juror with the third-lowest
conviction probability is a group-a juror, ..., and the jurors with the three highest conviction
probabilities are all group-b jurors. To explain the structure of the proof, suppose that n
is even (we explain below how the argument generalizes to any n). We first construct a
partition of {a, b}n into two subsets Sa and Sb of equal size and construct a bijection q
between Sa and Sb. We then show that for every panel configuration l ∈ Sa which results
in ml group-a jurors being selected, (a) the panel configuration q[l] result j −ml group-a
jurors being selected, and (b) panel configurations l and q[l] are equally likely. As in the
proof of Part (b), the result then follows directly.
Similar to the proof of Part (b), the bijection q[l] is obtained by (i) mirroring l around
the ⌊n/2⌋ position, and (ii) inverting the group of each juror in the resulting panel config-
uration. For example, panel configuration q[(a, a, b, a)] is obtained by mirroring (a, a, b, a)
around position ⌊n/2⌋, which results in (a, b, a, a), and then inverting the group of each
jurors in (a, b, a, a), which results in (b, a, b, b). Formally, if inv[l] denotes the configura-
tion that results from turning all the a’s in l into b’s and all the b’s in l into a’s, then
q[(l1, l2, . . . , ln−1, ln)] = inv[(ln, ln−1, . . . , l2, l1)].
Let Sa and Sb be two sets that together contain all l for which l 6= q[l] and are such




= l, the sets Sa and Sb have equal sizes. Also
let S∗ contain all l for which l = q[l], if any (S∗ 6= ∅ if and only if n is even). Note that
{Sa, Sb, S∗} forms of partition of {a, b}n. Therefore, if we let (#m|l) denote the number
of group-a juror that are selected conditional on configuration l and P(l) the probability of








Part (b) then follows from the fact that (A) P(l) = P(q[l]) for all l ∈ Sa, (B) (#m|l) =
n− (#m|q[l]) for all l ∈ Sa, and (C) (#m|l) = j/2 for all l ∈ S∗.
Properties (B) and (C) follow directly from the construction of q and the fact that d = p.
Property (A), on the other hand, follows from Lemma 4 which establishes the symmetry of
order statistics for symmetric distributions. A formal proof of (A) using Lemma 4 requires
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heavy and tedious notation. Instead, we show how (A) follows from Lemma 4 in a simple
example that clarifies how the argument generalizes to other cases.
Consider the case of (a, a, b) for which q[(a, a, b)] = (a, b, b). We can obtain the probabil-
ity of any configuration by integrating the p.d.f. of the appropriate order statistics from the
bottom to the top of [0, 1]. For example, using the notation for order statistics introduced
before Lemma 4, we have
P[(a, a, b)] = P[m = 2] ∗ P [(a, a, b)|m = 2]














We can also obtain the probability of any configuration by reverting the list of order statistics
and integrating from the top to the bottom of [0, 1]. For example,
P[(a, b, b)]
= P[m = 1] ∗ P [(a, b, b)|m = 1]


















a (y) = f
1,2
b (1−y), and f
1,1
b (w) = f
1,1
a (1−w),
which together with symmetry of the binomial with 0.5 probability of success implies that
the expressions in (10) and (11) are equal.
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B External Appendix: Additional simulations
B.1 Excluding extremes, uniform distribution of conviction probabilities
Figure B.1: Fraction of juries with at least one extreme juror




















Note: Results from 50,000 simulations of jury selections with parameters j = 12, d = p = 6, and C ∼ U [0, 1]
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B.2 Minority representation when minorities favor conviction
Table B.1: Representation of Group-a jurors in the effective jury when Group-a
is a minority of the jury pool
Polarization Extreme Moderate Mild (All)
Procedure S&R STR S&R STR S&R STR RAN
Average fraction of minorities 0.12 0.08 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.25
Standard deviation 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Fraction of juries with at least 1 0.76 0.45 0.89 0.85 0.96 0.95 0.97
(a) Group-a represents 25% of the jury pool
Polarization Extreme Moderate Mild (All)
Procedure S&R STR S&R STR S&R STR RAN
Average fraction of minorities 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.10
Standard deviation 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09
Fraction of juries with at least 1 0.09 0.02 0.44 0.38 0.66 0.64 0.72
(b) Group-a represents 10% of the jury pool
Note: The rows report the average number and standard deviation of group-a jury members, and the percent
of juries with at least one group-a jurors, out of 50,000 simulations of jury selection with parameters j = 12
and d = p = 6. Conviction probabilities are drawn for from Beta(1, 5), Beta(5, 1), respectively for Group-a,
Group-b jurors (Extreme), from Beta(2, 4), Beta(4, 2) (Moderate), and from Beta(3, 4), Beta(4, 3) (Mild);
see Figure 3 for the shape of these distributions.
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B.3 Excluding unbalanced juries, simulations from mild and moderate
polarization
Figure B.2: Probability of selecting jurors below the median, difference with
RAN



























S&R, r = .90
S&R, r = .75
S&R, r = .5
(a) Moderate polarization

























S&R, r = .90
S&R, r = .75
S&R, r = .5
(b) Mild polarization
Note: The chart displays the probability of selecting a number of jurors with ci below the median under STR
(green dashed line) and S&R (orange lines) relative to the same probability under RAN , i.e. TM (x;med[C])−
T
RAN
(x;med[C]). The model parameters are j = 12, d = p = 6 and C ∼ r ·Beta(2, 4)+(1−r) ·Beta(4, 2) for
Panel (a) and C ∼ r ·Beta(3, 4) + (1− r) ·Beta(4, 3), for r = {0.1, 0.25, 0.5} Values for S&R are the results
from 50,000 simulations of jury selection, whereas values for RAN and STR are computed analytically and
are independent of r (see Footnote 36).
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